

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BUCHAREST 1135

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: HU, RO, BU, UR
SUBJ: TRANSYLVANIA, BESSARABIA, MACEDONIA: THE RECENT
HISTORICAL RECORD
REFS: (A) BUDAPEST 768 (NOTAL), (B) BUDAPEST 767 (NOTAL),
(C) BUDAPEST 583 (NOTAL), (D) BUCHAREST 952 (NOTAL),
(E) BUDAPEST 415, (F) BUCHAREST 791 (NOTAL),
(G) BUCHAREST 772 (NOTAL), (H) BUCHAREST 696 (NOTAL),
(I) BUCHAREST 608 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. SINCE QUESTIONS OF SINCERITY RAISED BY CURRENT
SPATE OF HISTORICAL POLEMICS ARE BASICALLY UNANSWERABLE, WE
SUGGEST LOOK AT RECENT HISTORICAL RECORD, AS COMPLEMENT TO
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BUDAPEST'S FINE ANALYSES OF HUNGARIAN MOTIVES IN CURRENT
ROUND, IN WAKE OF ANDREI VISIT (REF A-C). RECORD SHOWS
MOST RECENT CEAUSESCU FORAY (REF I) TO BE
SUBSTANTIAL REPLY OF MAY 1966 SPEECH ASSERTING
STRONGEST CLAIM YET TO BESSARABIA, AND CIRCUMSTANCES
INCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT HUNGARIANS WERE PRESSING FOR

ON HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA, AS THEY ALSO DID ON TWO SUBSEQUENT OCCASIONS, IN 1968 AND 1971, WHEN ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENCE WAS AT ITS MOST SPECTACULAR. 1966 UPSHOT WAS BREZHNEV VISIT TO BUCHAREST AND HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF SOVIET/EE STATE AND PARTY CHIEFS WHICH DISAVOWED TERRITORIAL CLAIMS. WE SUSPECT THIS RECORD IS PRIMARY FACTOR PROMPTING ROMANIANS TO SEE SOVIET HAND IN HUNGARIAN STATEMENTS ON TRANSYLVANIA (AND BULGARIAN-YUGOSLAV POLEMICS IN MACEDONIA) AT TIME WHEN BOOM OS OFF 1976 BILATERAL MINI-RECONCILIATION WITH SOVIETS. WHAT UPSHOT WILL BE IN THIS CASE IS HARD TO DISCERN: IMPROVEMENTS IN CONDITIONS FOR MAGYAR MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA ARE CERTAINLY ONE POSSIBILITY. BUT IT OCCURS TO US THAT HISTORICIST ROMANIANS MAY BE SEEKING REPEAT OF 1966 MULTILATERALIZED DISAVOWAL OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN AREA (CEAUSESCU'S OWN 1976 DISAVOWAL WAS UNILATERAL), AND THAT THIS LOGIC MAY HELP EXPLAIN MOVEMENT TOWARD HIGH-LEVEL MEETING IN BUDAPEST (REF E) AND LAST WEEK'S SURPRISE TRIP BY DOLANC TO ROMANIA. END SUMMARY.

2. EMBASSY BUDAPEST'S FINE ASSESSMENTS OF HUNGARIAN BACKGROUND AND MOTIVES IN RECENT PUBLIC EXCHANGES ON TRANSYLVANIA, TOGETHER WITH KINDS OF STATEMENTS WE HAVE BEEN HEARING FROM ROMANIAN EDITORS HERE
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ON BOTH TRANSYLVANIA AND BEESARABIA, WILL RAISE QUESTIONS OF SINCERITY ON ALL SIDES, EVEN IF DEBATE PROCEEDS NO FURTHER IN PUBLIC IN WAKE OF RCP CC SECRETARY ANDREI'S VISIT TO BUDAPEST (REF A). SPECIFICALLY, BEYOND QUESTION OF WHO STARTED EXCHANGES ON WHICH ISSUE, IT WILL BE ASKED WHETHER HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP IS RESPONDING TO PRESSURE OF SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC "PUBLIC OPINION" OR DOING MOSCOW'S WORK IN APPLYING PRESSURE ON ROMANIANS OVER TRANSYLVANIA; WHETHER ROMANIANS ACTUALLY BELIEVE HUNGARIANS ARE DOING MOSCOW'S WORK, OR ARE MERELY PRETENDING TO DO SO FOR BENEFIT OF US AND OTHER WESTERN OFFICIALS; AND WHETHER ROMANIANS ARE AGITATING BESSARABIAN ISSUE BECAUSE THEY ARE ACTUALLY ANGRY ABOUT IT, OR BECAUSE THEY FIND IT BEST (IF INDIRECT) INSTRUMENT FOR CONVINCING SOVIETS TO MODERATE HUNGARIAN ENTHUSIASM FOR RIGHTS OF MAGYAR MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA.

3. THESE ARE IMPORTANT, EVEN VITAL QUESTIONS, BECAUSE THEY GO TO HEART OF POLITICKING CURRENTLY UNDERWAY. IF WE HAD ACCESS TO REAL ANSWERS, USG WOULD HAVE MUCH BETTER PICTURE OF SUBSTRUCTURE OF

POLITICS IN THIS PART OF WORLD. DIFFICULTY, WE
THINK, IS THAT QUESTIONS ARE BASICALLY UNANSWERABLE,
INVOLVING AS THEY DO VARIETIES OF INTERESTS AND
MURKY PASSIONS IN EACH COUNTRY, AS WELL AS MATTERS
OF STATE AND PARTY POLICY WHICH CAN BE DISCUSSED
ONLY ELLIPTICALLY, IF AT ALL, WITH OUTSIDERS.
(SAME CAVEAT APPLY, IT SEEMS TO US, TO MACEDONIAN
ISSUE NOW BUBBLING UP AGAIN BETWEEN BULGARIA AND
YUGOSLAVIA.) IF INDIRECT ANALYSIS IS BEST AVAILABLE,
HOWEVER, IT MAY ALSO BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER SOME OF
HISTORICAL RECORD, AS COMPLEMENT TO BUDAPEST'S
CAREFUL SIFTING OF HUNGARIAN FACTORS. BEST RECORD
WE HAVE IS ROBERT KING'S 1973 "MINORITIES UNDER
COMMUNISM" PUBLISHED BY HARVARD.
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4. COMPARISON OF CEAUSESCU'S SPEECHES OF MAY 7,
1966, AND JANUARY 24, 1978, SHOW LATEST FORAY TO
BE SUBSTANTIALLY A RECYCLING OF MAJOR STATEMENT MADE
ALMOST TWELVE YEARS AGO. 1966 SPEECH REMAINS
STRONGEST ASSERTION YET OF ROMANIAN CLAIM TO
BESSARABIA. IN NEITHER CASE IS BESSARABIA MEN-
TIONED; IN BOTH, FRAMEWORK IS OSTENSIBLY THEORETI-
CAL. AS HE DID JANUARY 24, BUT IN MORE DETAIL,
CEAUSESCU IN 1966 CONDEMNED INTERWAR ROMANIAN PARTY
RESOLUTIONS MADE AT COMINTERN BEHEST LABELLING

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BUCHAREST 1135

ROMANIA "TYPICAL MULTINATIONAL STATE" CREATED ON BASIS OF "OCCUPATION OF CERTAIN FOREIGN TERRITORIES." IN LATEST SPEECH HE ATTACKED THEORY THAT INTERWAR ROMANIA WAS "IMPERIALIST" STATE, BUT DIFFERENCE IS INSIGNIFICANT, AND POINT OBVIOUSLY THE SAME.

5. PRELUDE TO 1966 SPEECH INCLUDED NOT ONLY TWO YEARS OF HISTORICAL POLEMICS OVER BESSARABIA, BUT INDICATIONS THAT HUNGARY--"WITH SOVIET KNOWLEDGE IF NOT AT SOVIET REQUEST," AS KING PUTS IT--WAS PRESURING ROMANIA ON QUESTION OF MAGYAR MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA. HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER MINORITY TO ROMANIANS AT VARIOUS TIMES
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SINCE 1959, "AND THERE WERE SOME REPORTS INEARLY 1966 THAT HUNGARIANS HAD AGAIN RAISED ISSUE WITH ROMANIANS."

6. NOT ONLY HAD HUNGARY (ACCORDING TO KING) BECOME MAJOR BLOC CRITIC OF ROMANIA'S INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY IN MID-1960'S, I.E., IMMEDIATE TIME-FRAME FOR MAY 1966 SPEECH, BUT PATTERN OF HUNGARIAN INTERVENTION AT CRITICAL STAGES IN DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENCE WAS REPEATED ON TWO SUBSEQUENT OCCASIONS: IMMEDIATELY AFTER CZECHSLOVAK INVASION, WHEN HUNGARIAN POLITBURO MEMBER AND NATIONALITIES EXPERT DEZSO NEMES VISITED BUCHAREST, AND ON JUNE 24, 1971, WHEN ZOLTAN KIMOCSIN RAISED TRANSYLVANIAN MINORITY ISSUE IN PUBLIC SPEECH VERY DAY CEAUSESCU RETURNED FROM HIS GROUND-BREAKING VISIT TO CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN COMMUNIST STATES.

7. IMMEDIATE UPSHOT OF CEAUSESCU'S 1966 SPEECH ON BESSARABIA WAS SUDDEN UNOFFICIAL VISIT OF BREZHNEV TO BUCHAREST AND, IN JULY 1966, CONFERENCE

OF WARSAW PACT PARTY FIRST SECRETARIES AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN WARSAW. QUESTION OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS WAS EXPLICITLY DISCUSSED IN CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE, WHICH DECLARED THAT "ONE OF MAIN PRE-REQUISITES FOR GUARANTEEING EUROPEAN SECURITY IS INVIOABILITY OF EXISTING FRONTIERS BETWEEN EUROPEAN STATES," AND THAT WARSAW PACT MEMBERS "HAVE NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN RELATION TO ANY EUROPEAN STATE." MAIN POINT, AT THAT TIME, WAS OBVIOUSLY GDR BORDERS WITH POLAND AND FRG, BUT BESSARABIA AND TRANSYLVANIA COME UNDER SAME
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UMBRELLA.

8. PENULTIMATE ROUND IN BESSARABIAN MINUET, IN 1976, APPEARS ALSO TO HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN PULLING AND HAULING OVER TRANSYLVANIAN MINORITY, AT LEAST IN SENSE THAT HUNGARIANS INFORMALLY RAISED ISSUE WITH OTHER PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING NORWAY, IN 1973-5. ON SPECIFIC ISSUE OF BESSARABIA, IT WILL BE RECALLED, MONTHS OF HISTORICAL SPLEEN CULMINATED IN MAY 1976 BUCHAREST VISIT OF THEN CC SECRETARY KATUSHEV IN WHICH AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO DAMPEN POLEMICS; CEAUSESCU'S JUNE 1976 DECLARATION THAT ROMANIA HAS NO TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS WITH ANY NEIGHBOR; AND HIS SURPRISE VISIT THAT SUMMER TO SOVIET MOLDAVIA. AT THE TIME, THESE MOVES TOGETHER CONSTITUTED ROMANIAN RETREAT, FOR MOST OBSERVERS. IT IS WORTH POINTING OUT, HOWEVER, THAT "ANY NEIGHBOR" INCLUDES HUNGARY, AS FAR AS ROMANIANS ARE CONCERNED.

9. ALTHOUGH DENOUEMENT WAS MUFFLED, DAMPING DOWN OF BESSARABIA POLEMICS APPEARS ALSO TO HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY MORE RESTRAINED HUNGARIAN APPROACH TO TRANSYLVANIA, IN MID-1960'S AS IN MID-1970'S.

10. ROMANIANS ARE VERY, EVEN EXCESSIVELY, HISTORICIST, AND WE SUSPECT THEIR REAL READING OF CURRENT SITUATION IS BASED AT LEAST AS HEAVILY ON HISTORICAL RECORD SKETCHED OUT ABOVE AS ON ANY ASSESSMENT OF KADAR'S PERSONAL FEELINGS FOR CEAUSESCU OR BY HIS SENSITIVITY TO HUNGARIAN PUBLIC OPINION, WHICH THEY PROBABLY CONSIDER ABOUT ON PAR WITH THEIR OWN, SO INDEPENDENT VARIABLE IN POLICY FORMATION. AS THEY ALMOST CERTAINLY SEE IT, PRESSURE ON KADAR TO AGITATE TRANSYLVANIAN MINORITY ISSUE IS STRONG AT ALL TIMES; ONLY RESTRAINING HAND OF SOVIETS PREVENTS HIM FROM
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VENTING IT IN PUBLIC; IF HE DOES SO, THIS MEANS
RESRAINING HAND HAS BEEN LIFTED FOR SOVIET POLICY
PURPOSES; AND PROVEN WAS TO RESTORE IT IS TO REMIND
SOVIETS OF THEIR OWN VULNERABILITY OF MINORITY ISSUE
BY RAISING BESSARABIA. SOVIET POLICY PURPOSES MAY
BE MULTIPLE, BUT CURRENT AGITATION COMES AT POINT
IN TIME WHERE MINI-RECONCILIATION OF 1976 HAS
CLEARLY PASSED ITS PEAK. "COINCIDENTALLY," MEAN-
WHILE, MACEDONIAN DISPUTE AGAIN ARISES INTO PUBLIC
DOMAIN IN SOUTH, WITH YUSOSLAV FRIENDS (AND EVEN-
TUALLY THEMSELVES, WITH REGARD TO DOBROGEA ISSUE)
ON ONE SIDE AND BULGARIANS, WHOM ROMANIANS CONSIDER
EVEN MORE FAITHFUL SOVIET HENCHMEN THAN HUNGARIANS,
ON OTHER. ROMANIANS FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE IN
COINCIDENCES OF THIS KIND WHEN THEY DEAL WITH
SOVIETS; AS PARTY HISTORY DIRECTOR POPESCU-PUTURI
PUT IT TO DCM FEBRUARY 2, DUTY OF POLICY-MAKERS IS
"TO AVERT THE FORTUITOUS" (PREINTIMPINA INTIMPLATORUL).

11. WHAT UPSHOT WILL BE THIS TIME IS HARD TO SAY.
AGAIN, WITH HISTORICAL TRACK RECORD IN MIND, THERE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BUCHAREST 1135

SEEM TO BE SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES. ROMANIAN-
HUNGARIAN TENSION OVER MAGYAR MINORITY IN MID-
AND LATE 1960'S WAS NOT ONLY ACCOMPANIED BY PUBLIC
EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR RCP MINORITY POLICY FROM
LOCAL MAGYAR NOTABLES, LIKE THOSE NOW BEGINNING TO
APPEAR AGAIN IN ROMANIAN MEDIA, BUT WAS FOLLOWED BY
SOME IMPROVEMENTS IN CONDITIONS FOR MINORITY. SUCH
IMPROVEMENTS ARE CERTAINLY NOT BE BE RULED OUT AT
PRESENT JUNCTURE. IF HUNGARIAN MOTIVE IS TO FORCE
BETTER ROMANIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF JUNE 1977 KADAR-
CEAUSESCU ACCORD, CURRENT POLEMICS (WHICH RAISE
SPECTER OF DROIT DE REGARD, I.E., LEGITIMIZED INTER-
FERENCE, FOR ROMANIANS) WILL PROBABLY NOT HELP, BUT
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THEY MAY, IF ONLY BY REINFORCING INCENTIVES TO IMPROVE
CONDITIONS FOR MINORITIES IN OTHER AREAS. FINALLY,
THREAT TO RESURRECT POLEMICS OVER BESSARABIA MAY
CONCEIVABLY SERVE TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM SOVIETS.

12. IT OCCURS TO US, HOWEVER, THAT ROMANIANS WITH
THEIR HISTORICIST BENT MAY BE SEEKING A CULIMINATION
COMPARABLE TO THAT ACHIEVED IN 1966: A SOLEMN REITERA-
TION, AT HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF SOVIET/EE LEADERS, OF
DISAVOWAL OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN SOVIET/SE EUROPEAN
AREA. CEAUSESCU'S JUNE 1976 DISAVOWAL WAS UNILATERAL,
AND IT WOULD BE LOGICAL FOR GOR TO SEEK TO MULTI-
LATERALIZE IT, WITH SOVIETS, HUNGARIANS AND
BULGARIANS ON BOARD, AT A MOMENT WHEN HOPE OF
EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO BALKANS IN BELGRADE DOCUMENT
HAS DISAPPEARED, AND TRANSYLVANIA AND MACEDONIA
ISSUES ARE BOTH HEATING UP. THIS LOGIC, AS WE
SEE IT, MAY HELP EXPLAIN BOTH MOVEMENT TOWARD
HIGH-LEVEL MEETING AT BUDAPEST (REF E) AND SURPRISING
AND STILL INADEQUATELY EXPLAINED DOLANC VISIT TO
ROMANIA LAST WEEK.
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